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Identifying obstacles to a multidisciplinary understanding of ‘disruptive’ 
behaviour 
 
Current literature on disruptive or disturbing behaviour in young people tends not to 
cross-disciplinary boundaries. Some research from within the field of educational 
studies does acknowledge the existence of brain-based studies, particularly in relation 
to Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) (e.g., Armstrong 2006). 
However the detail of such studies is not engaged with in any depth; either they are 
mentioned in passing as 'interesting and promising' (Cooper 2006: 252) or the basic 
assumptions underpinning such an approach is critiqued. A recent edited volume on 
ADHD (Lloyd, Stead and Cohen 2006) contains references to neurological 
perspectives but does not include a chapter from an authority in this area. Similarly, 
the majority of the literature in the health and medical sciences makes no mention of 
sociological perspectives.  
 
Disruptive behaviour is a social event that will have meaning(s) for the individual and 
be made sense of by those around her in different ways. But the tendency to behave in 
such a way may well be related to particular neural structures and patterns of activity 
as well as a host of other factors. The question of what causes a 14 year old pupil to 
swear and spit at his teacher and rip things from the wall as he exits (loudly) the 
classroom cannot be answered solely by neuropsychological test scores, functional 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI), in-depth interviews with pupil and teacher, 
examining the curriculum, assessing the ethos of the school, taking a developmental 
history, studying the physical space involved, analysis of diet, observation of peer 
interactions, asking the young man to make a collage of how he was feeling at the 
time, nor by inviting him to engage on an auto/ethnographic study. None of these 
methods alone will provide the full picture of why that behaviour and why then. What 
they will do is address different levels of analysis of the incident – some at the 
microscopic level of genetic profile, some at the level of neural networks, and so on 
up to the widest frame offered by educational sociology, an examination of the social 
world. The key point here is that at each of these levels what counts as data and the 
best way to gather or generate those data will be different. Different approaches are 
not in competition but are seeking to explain different things– a scan from an fMRI 
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cannot tell us what it feels like to be the ‘disruptive’ pupil, similarly talking with the 
young man will not reveal atypical patterns of brain activity. Working across 
disciplinary boundaries will require a common understanding of the nature of the 
knowledge created or discovered through each discipline and what it can offer.  
 
This paper examines the challenges presented by multidisciplinary approach to the 
study of behaviour of young people, which causes adults concern. The emphasis on 
problematic behaviour is important as there has very recently been significant 
progress in the emerging field, which has become known as ‘neuroeducation’ more 
generally (Howard Jones 2009).  The potential of neuroscience to inform and enhance 
classroom practice has been generally well received. Indeed in many cases the 
neuroscientists are asking for teachers to take a much more critical stance towards 
various brain based explanations (Della Sala 2007). It should be noted that not all are 
uncritical advocates, for example Bridges (2009) questions whether the current 
enthusiasm for the application of ‘science’ to education might be to by-pass the 
‘inconvenience’ of pupil and teacher experience. Despite the developments in 
neuroeducation generally there has been slower progress in developing 
multidisciplinary approaches to the investigation of behaviour problems. Some 
possible reasons for this are explored below. In this paper it will be argued that whilst 
a multidisciplinary approach is to be welcomed, work needs to be done in order to 
ensure that educational research joins the discussion as an equal partner. 
 
The first section offers a demonstration of how big the gaps are between different 
approaches to understanding disruptive behaviour and the styles of writing typical in 
these approaches. This is done through a consideration of the contribution of studies 
in educational sociology that take a ‘soft’ qualitative approach to research, and in 
neuropsychology, a ‘hard science’. The degree of divergence between these two 
approaches is then highlighted through a discussion of the ‘medicalisation’ of 
disruptive behaviour. Following that the concern that educational research may be 
treated as a ‘poor relation’ will be examined, with a focus on the underlying 
epistemological issues. Having identified some of the challenges facing 
interdisciplinary research some initial suggestions regarding basic requirements for 
successful work of this kind will be proposed.  
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It is important to note that this paper concerns the challenges to multidisciplinary 
research into disruptive behaviour. It is not within the scope of this paper to examine 
the practice of multidisciplinary work with young people with disruptive behaviour. 
This is of course not to down-play the importance of practice. The primary motivation 
for developing multidisciplinary research in this area must be to inform practice. A 
more robust understanding of the characteristics and experiences of young people 
whose behaviour gives adults cause for concern, one which draws on many varied 
sources of information, will provide practitioners with information that allows them to 
develop appropriate interventions and support. It is also worth noting that in practice 
there are some very positive examples of multi-agency work in this field (Pirrie et al 
2009), despite the significant challenges which have been identified (Sloper 2004, 
Milbourne 2005).  
 
Before embarking on the main argument, a note about terminology is required. The 
title of this paper refers to ‘disruptive behaviour’, but as readers of this journal will be 
only too aware, the use of language in this area is something of a minefield (e.g. Soles 
et al. 2008). The use of the term ‘social, emotional and behavioural difficulties’ 
(SEBD) is fraught with difficulties: it is a subjective term; it has been considered too 
vague to have any real meaning and it overlaps with other labels. The statement that a 
particular child ‘has’ SEBD does not give any clear indication of how the child might 
behave or what the reasons for the behaviour might be.  O’Brien (2005) argues that 
SEBD and similar labels such as ‘Emotional and Behavioural Difficulties’ (EBD) are 
‘generalised umbrella terms’.  As such they include young people who exhibit both 
externalising and internalising behaviour, that is those who are described as 
‘challenging’ as well as young people who may be described as ‘vulnerable’. 
 
The lack of conceptual clarity is not helped by the plethora of related terms and more 
recently the increasing numbers of related medical syndromes or conditions being 
identified (Lloyd 2003).  Labels such as ‘disaffected’, ‘disengaged’, ‘disruptive, 
‘delinquent’, ‘challenging’, ‘troubled and troubling’, and disorders including ADHD, 
Oppositional Defiant Disorder (ODD), and Conduct Disorder (CD) all have a degree 
of overlap with SEBD in terms of external behaviour. The relationship between 
SEBD and mental health is a particularly complex one; the DfE Circular of 1994  
(DfE 2004) described EBD as problems not so great as to be classed as mental illness.  
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However, as Cole et al. observe, ‘children said to have EBD will often have 
significant mental health difficulties…’ (2002: 9).  
 
Despite the overlap alluded to above it is important to note the different status of these 
terms, and three types of labels are identifiable. First, describing a pupil as disruptive 
or troublesome or withdrawn may well be an individual judgement. Second, for a 
pupil to be described as having SEBD (or any of its variations), we would expect 
more than one person to have expressed concern about them and some kind of formal 
assessment to have been carried out.  However what that assessment process involves 
will vary: there is no ‘test’ for SEBD.  Third, there are labels that signify a ‘disorder’. 
These differ in that, dissenting voices notwithstanding, they relate to recognised 
medical conditions that have a set of diagnostic criteria and recognised diagnostic 
tests. It is the first and second groups that seem to me to be of great interest.  In 
multidisciplinary research terms, we know very little about them. Young people 
labelled as experiencing social, emotional and behavioural difficulties or who are 
generally disruptive are usually excluded from neuropsychological research projects 
as they constitute neither a diagnostic group nor a control group. In contrast, much of 
the sociologically informed research has a focus on these groups who can present 
great challenges to educational professionals. Of course, one of the unanswered 
questions, and one which multidisciplinary research might be able to address, is 
whether we can identify three categorically distinct groups, rather than differences of 
degree, across a range of dimensions such as individual experience, causation, 
underlying neurobiology, and effective intervention. 
 
 
The view from educational sociology 
The methods of data collection used in sociological educational research are varied 
with anything from large-scale surveys to auto/ethnography finding a home within the 
discipline. In this section the focus is on studies that use qualitative approaches rather 
than those which use large-scale surveys to try to identify correlations between 
disruptive behaviour and social facts such as social class, IQ, and gender. Within this 
branch of educational sociology there has emerged a consensus view of ‘special 
needs’ as a social construction rather than an objective fact (Clark, Dyson and 
Millward 2003). Once this was established the search was on for the motivation 
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behind this construction. If the special education system was not, as had previously 
been thought, there to meet the needs of young people, then whose needs were being 
served?  
 
For example, Ford, Mongon and Whelan’s Special Education and Social Control 
(1982) adopts what is often described as a neo-marxist analysis of special education. 
The basic argument is that special educational provision has developed and expanded 
in response to the need to control a deviant section of the population who get in the 
way of the real work of schools, which is producing a labour-force. This control is 
generally achieved through the attachment of medical diagnoses to individuals. Thus 
the problem is clearly defined as lying within the child and not the system. Studies of 
disruptive behaviour which take social class as the key determining variable differ 
from each other in a number of ways. Disruption can be seen as resulting from 
resistance to the imposition of schooling, with young people responding to authority 
by either removing themselves from it (truancy), or rule-breaking. Disruptive 
behaviour is variously described as the working class rebelling against the school 
values and creating anti-school values of their own; or, alternatively, it is a simpler 
case of cultural conflict – the values of the working class bring young people who live 
according to them into conflict with school systems. The extent to which young 
people are said to be involved in deterministic reproduction, as opposed to active 
participation in cultural production (Willis 1977), also varies.   
 
Perhaps the most influential theoretical perspective on current writing in the field of 
special education, is post-modernism. As its name suggests, post-modernism is a 
rejection of modernism, the enlightenment project and, ‘indeed any integrated or 
coherent thought system which attempts to find an overall pattern in social structures 
or historical development’ (Green 1994: 72). Within educational research it would 
appear that of all those who might become attached to the post-modernist label, 
Foucault has been the most influential. Foucault’s work is associated with post-
modernism because of his view that knowledge is socially created through the 
exercise of domination (McCarthy 1990). For Foucault power did not reside simply in 
the hierarchical (and vertical) structure of society; it is more insidious (and 
horizontal). Humans are made into subjects through the sciences treating them as 
objects to study. Science also divides people – psychiatry defines the sane and insane 
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– and throughout history new ways of being deviant are constantly uncovered and 
legitimised through scientific ‘discovery’. Within the field of special education 
Foucault’s work is most often used to ‘rescue’ the agency of pupils who attract the 
‘special needs’ label by identifying their resistance, transgression, and opportunities 
to find other sources of subjectivity (e.g., Laws and Davis 2000). 
 
The attractiveness of Foucault’s work for those engaged in research in special 
education is clear. By making problematic the ‘taken-for-granted’, new avenues of 
research have come to the fore (Paechter and Weiner 1996). Within special education 
this has led to the examination of the role of professionals in creating ways of not 
being ‘normal’ (Tomlinson 1982), and the experiences of those not traditionally given 
a voice have been heard (Davis and Watson 2001). For Paechter and Weiner it is, ‘By 
drawing attention to the importance of the ‘local’, they [post-modernists] enable the 
focus to move to inequalities at the micro-level where researchers are in a position to 
observe different forms of domination and resistance, largely overlooked by macro, 
modernist perspectives’ (1996: 269).  
 
In terms of large-scale empirical research into disruptive behaviour from a broadly 
sociological perspective (examining not only the ‘disruptive’ pupils but also their 
social context), the largest studies, certainly in the UK, have been those 
commissioned by government. In some of these the focus is on perceptions of levels 
of school indiscipline, e.g. the ‘Discipline in Scottish Schools’ research that has been 
conducted in 1990, 1996, 2004 and most recently in 2009 (Munn, Johnstone and 
Sharp 2004). A second strand in government-funded research is the evaluation of 
particular initiatives. For example, in Scotland we have had the evaluation of 
Restorative Practices (Kane et al. 2006), and in England and Wales, of the Behaviour 
Improvement Programme, the Primary Behaviour and Attendance pilot and the 
Secondary Social, Emotional and Behavioural Skills pilot (Hallam et al. 2005; 
Hallam, Rhamie and Shaw 2006; Smith et al. 2007). What these have in common is a 
focus on the general pupil population. In the third strand of government funded 
research the focus shifts to pupils who present a greater than average challenge to the 
school system. A key project here is that by Daniels et al. (2003) examining the 
outcomes for young people permanently excluded from school. More recently, and in 
response to concerns raised in the Steer Report (DfES 2005), research has been 
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commissioned by the DCSF (Department of Children Schools and Families) into the 
outcomes for pupils who are permanently excluded from PRUs and special schools 
(Pirrie et al. 2009). What these studies have in common is an interest in the wider 
experiences of the young people, and a focus in the findings on the complexity of 
their lives, on the contingency of outcomes and on the importance of relationships 
with key people. 
 
It is impossible to summarise the key principles of research in this area and do justice 
to all approaches. However it is perhaps reasonable to say that much of the work on 
disruptive behaviour within more qualitative branches of educational sociology is 
concerned with how individuals make sense of and negotiate the social world 
(including discourses as well as structural factors) in which they live and addresses 
the ways in which they may be constrained, (and perhaps be complicit in their 
constraint), by that world. A neuropsychological perspective on disruptive behaviour, 
as we shall see below, takes a radically different view. 
 
The view from Neuropsychology  
This section of the paper is written in the style associated with work in this discipline.  
The intention behind writing in this manner is to demonstrate that it is not only the 
content of what is written which separates the different perspectives, but also the 
manner of the writing. This section necessarily focuses on studies of young people 
who are said to meet the diagnostic criteria for one or more of the disruptive 
behaviour disorders such as ODD, ADHD or CD: young people with disruptive 
behaviour and/or a label of SEBD/EBD but no diagnosis are generally specifically 
excluded from studies of this kind. 
 
A deficit in executive function has been associated with a number of disorders 
including ADHD, schizophrenia, autism, ODD/CD and reading disability 
(Banaschewski et al. 2005). Of these disorders, it is ODD/CD and ADHD that are 
most consistently associated with disruptive behaviour. The research in relation to 
ADHD is extensive, however the origins and pathology of this disorder are not clearly 
understood (Thapar, O’Donovan and Owen 2005). Kenemans et al. (2005) note that 'it 
has to be conceded that there is still very limited insight as to what the fundamental 
deficit(s) is (are) that underlie the various clinical symptoms in AD/HD' (p.60); a 
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view which is shared with other researchers in the field (Vaidya et al. 2005). While 
earlier studies on young people with ADHD generated a great deal of evidence in 
support of a deficit in response inhibition underlying behaviour associated with 
ADHD (Quay 1997), more recently other explanations have been put forward, such as 
a deficit in motivation (Oosterlann and Sergeant 1998; Banaschewski et al. 2005) or in 
strategic planning (Clark, Prior and Kinsella 2000). Other research has suggested that 
the co-morbidity between ADHD and other conditions has led to deficits being 
mistakenly attributed to ADHD when they are better explained by the co-morbid 
condition, (Jonsdottir et al. 2006). However despite these recent developments it is 
common to encounter assertions in very recent studies that the inability to suppress 
inappropriate actions (Casey and Durston 2006; Pliszka et al. 2006), or a deficit in 
executive function more generally (Fugetta 2006) is at the root of ADHD.  
 
The evidence for an executive dysfunction element of ODD/CD is less strong 
(Banaschweski et al. 2005). The performance of young people with ODD/CD on the 
Stop task has been 'less robust' than for ADHD in identifying a response inhibition 
deficit (Oosterlan, Logan and Sergeant 1998) although some studies have found a 
reduced stop signal reaction time (Albrecht et al. 2005). Rubia et al. (2001) found no 
impairment in their psychiatric control group on Go/No – Go (GNG), Stop or reversal 
delay tasks from the MARS battery (Maudsley Attention and Response Suppression 
Task). On the Tower of Hanoi planning task, those with  ODD/CD have been found 
not to have a deficit (Klorman et al. 1999). Sergeant, Guerts and Oosterlan (2002) did 
find that performance on Stroop was implicated in ODD/CD as well as ADHD, and 
Van Goozen et al. (2004) found that a group with ODD performed less well on 
response perseveration tasks, concluding that those with ODD did not have an 
executive function deficit but had problems regulating their behaviour under 
motivational inhibitory conditions. In a test using seven measures of impulsivity 
Avila et al. (2004) identified two factors which results loaded onto - the first which 
they termed the strong inhibitory control factor related to performance on Stop, 
Continuous performance test, Matching familiar items and Circle tracing - this factor 
did not correlate with ODD, the second factor  - resistance to interference - which the 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Task and efficiency in the DRL (differential reinforcement of 
low rate responding) task loaded onto, was only slightly correlated with ODD. 
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Studies which have used functional MRI (fMRI) have identified differences (reduced 
activation, increased activation, and/or engagement of different areas) between brain 
activity in young people with ADHD compared with normal controls. These 
differences are located in the prefrontal and striatal regions (Vaidya et al. 2005; 
Pliszka et al. 2006; Smith et al. 2006). Recruitment of non-typical areas of the brain 
and underactivation of more typical areas could reflect a delay in development, a 
deficit in the more commonly used area, anxiety as a result of the demands of the 
task, or simply a different pattern of brain function. While Smith et al. (2006) found 
no significant difference in brain activity using Stroop with a group with ADHD, they 
did find a difference on GNG. Asahi et al. (2004) found that high impulsivity links to 
reduced activation in right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex on GNG. Bearegard and 
Levesque (2006) cite previous fMRI studies on GNG tasks with ADHD in which the 
following areas have been activated: anterior cingulated cortex, dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex, orbitofrontal cortex, ventrolateral prefrontal cortex and striatum, in addition 
under-activation of striatum and prefrontal regions have been observed. The parietal 
cortex is consistently activated in GNG tasks (Singer and Minzer 2003; Mueller et al. 
2006) especially in the right hemisphere and it has been suggested by Hershey et al. 
(2004) that over-activity is the cause of poor inhibition or a response to failure to 
inhibit and thus needing to pay more attention next time.  
 
Medicalisation 
If the differences between the educational and the neuropsychological approach 
require further highlighting, then a discussion of the concept of ‘medicalisation’ will  
assist.  Purdie, Hattie and Carroll (2002) describe the medical approach as one which 
assumes that there is a norm of behaviour, from which any deviation is viewed as a 
result of pathology or disease which requires ‘treatment’. They go on to argue that 
problems arise because what counts as ‘normal’ when applied to expected behaviour 
in the school context is not fixed. Behaviour which in one classroom may be 
considered normal, may, in another, lead to referral to an educational psychologist or 
child psychiatrist for assessment. In recent years there has been an increase in the 
numbers of young people who are said to have a ‘disruptive behaviour disorder’. 
Prevalence studies of ADHD have found rates ranging from 1% - 20%, with 
differences between measured rates apparently attributable to methodological rather 
than cultural differences (Polanczyk et al. 2007).  Most literature cites a rate of 
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between 3 and 5%, although as Purdie et al. (2002) note much higher rates are 
commonly reported.  
 
Although the deficit or ‘medical’ model has a long history in special education, it has 
recently experienced something of a revival, interactionist accounts having dominated 
in the field of educational studies (Macleod and Munn 2004).  There have been a 
number of attempts to account for the recent return to deficit thinking. Lloyd and 
Norris (1999) drawing on Slee (1995) suggest that the motivation behind the 
medicalisation of troubling behaviour is that it creates a ‘label of forgiveness’ which 
removes blame – but in which the individual is construed as ill. Tait (2003) expresses 
concern with the rise in the number of pupils who are said to have some kind of 
‘disorder’, because of the implication that their behaviour is at least in part 
determined, and as a consequence the extent to which they can be held accountable 
for their behaviour is diminished. This ‘forgiveness’ applies to all involved parties, 
the parents are no longer held accountable on grounds of poor parenting, and the 
teacher is no longer expected to be able to ‘manage’ the young person on the same 
terms as those who have no such redeeming label. 
 
The 'medicalisation of naughtiness', whilst carrying apparent advantage for some 
interested parties, is a matter of concern. First, as Tait (2003) notes it can lead to the 
individual not being held responsible for their behaviour, and whilst this may be 
attractive (particularly to the individual concerned!) in the short term, it has long term 
consequences for the type of intervention thought to be possible (Macleod 2006). If 
young people are not held to be accountable for their own behaviour then there would 
be little point in engaging with them in discussion about their behaviour and the 
consequences of it. Little point also in engaging the family in any kind of therapeutic 
or behavioural programme, perhaps to examine the importance of boundaries and 
routines; if the young person is ill then (it becomes easy to argue) the solution ought 
to be a medical one. Families and individuals who may benefit from a range of 
interventions are given leverage to resist anything other than medical intervention. 
Second, the criteria for the diagnosis of 'conditions' such as ODD rely largely on 
judgements of behaviour. We know from previous studies that such judgements are 
highly subjective. For example whether a child is seen as bright and lively or as 
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having ADHD can be as much a matter of perceptions and assumptions relating to 
their class background as of observed behaviour (Jacobsen 2002).  
 
Critics of the use of medical approaches to understanding disruptive behaviour often 
highlight a reliance on rating scales as diagnostic tools as evidence that ADHD is a 
social construction not medical condition (Cohen 2006). They argue that the 
robustness of behavioural rating scales as diagnostic instruments can be challenged: 
many of the criteria can be seen as a matter of opinion. A further complication is that 
some of the behaviour which may lead to a diagnosis of, for example, ODD may in 
fact be developmentally appropriate at some stages of development, and although 
stages are usually related to, they are not tied to, specific chronological ages (Keenan 
and Wakschlag 2000). In addition the inclusion of 'violating the rights of others' and 
in some literature 'breaking the law' as a criteria for diagnosis of CD is extremely 
problematic for some to accept. The concept of 'rights' is as socially constructed as the 
law - in other cultures or at other times such notions would differ or not exist, thus 
their use as the basis for diagnosing a disorder implies that the disorder must also be 
socially constructed. There is no denying that some children and young people behave 
in more defiant and oppositional ways than others; rather the key difference of 
opinion is over whether these extremes constitute a medical condition. 
 
The medicalisation of behaviour, which is viewed by some as ‘not normal’, is 
currently under increased scrutiny as the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) is 
under revision. The DSM is the handbook for psychiatrists, now on its fourth edition, 
and with each new revision listing more of ways of being ‘disordered’ from 22 in the 
1900s to nearly 400 in the most recent version (Background Briefing 2009). The 
revised edition (DSM–V) is now due for completion in 2013 (Schatzberg 2010), and 
there is substantial debate about what changes ought to be made. A particular concern 
relating to disruptive behaviour is the possibility of moving from a categorical (an 
individual either has or has not got the condition) to a dimensional (the condition is on 
a spectrum) approach, with the resulting ‘widening of the net’ which this may entail. 
The most recent news from the American Psychiatric Association seems to confirm 
these plans to move from categories to symptom severity scales (Swedo 2009). 
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There is then a clear difference between the portrayal of, and explanation for 
disruptive behaviour in the neuropsychological and the educational literature. Whilst 
much of the writing in the former is applied to seeking more accurate 'measures' and 
identifying the exact nature of the deficit in executive function, or characteristic 
differences in neural structure and function, in education the debate over the status of 
disruptive behaviour as a diagnosable medical condition continues, alongside ‘what 
works’ research seeking to find a successful intervention. Given these differences, 
how realistic is it to envisage a research programme which drew on these diverse 
discipline and others in between? 
 
The challenge of interdisciplinary research 
At the start of the paper it was suggested that there are three barriers to researchers 
from within education engaging in multidisciplinary research. These are now 
discussed in more detail. The first is an apparent crisis of confidence within 
educational research. This links to the second, the current obsession amongst policy 
makers and funding councils for a particular kind of quantitative research. Finally, it 
can be argued that within the education research community there is some distrust (or 
at least misreading) of much of the medical and psychological research.  
 
In order for educational researchers to argue for the contribution which they can make 
to a multidisciplinary study there needs to be a degree of confidence in what the 
discipline can bring to the table, and it is not at all clear that such confidence exists. 
Research in education has attracted some harsh criticism over recent times but 
perhaps the most damaging attacks have come from within. Two opposing 
philosophical positions are seen as underpinning much of the conflict in educational 
research (Pring 2000), which has recently been re-opened with the advent of the ‘what 
works?’ research agenda. On the one side are the realists who assert the existence of 
an objective world existing independently of our knowledge of it. In contrast the 
relativist camp assert that the world is a social construction; there is nothing ‘out 
there’ to be discovered. However, much of the recent writing on this polarisation of 
views is aimed at, if not reconciling, at least narrowing the gap between, them (see, 
e.g. Bridges and Smith 2007). One attempt to do so is offered by Pring: ‘It is not that 
there are multiple realities. Rather there are different ways in which reality is 
conceived, and those differences may well reflect different practical interests and 
 13 
different traditions’ (2000: 254). Other attempts employ the tactic of asserting that 
their position has been misunderstood. A common theme in the literature from the 
‘realist’ position is that the critique offered by the relativists is of a ‘strawman’ 
(Moore and Muller 1999), either adopting a view of scientific method which would be 
unrecognisable to most scientists, or by equating realism with ‘naïve realism’ (Collier 
1994). Similarly, Laws and Davies (2000) comment that a ‘startling mode of 
dismissal’ (2000:206) of the post-modernist view rests in the assertion that for post-
modernists there can be no common narratives – an assertion they clearly reject.   
 
The differences between realism and relativisim can perhaps be better understood 
when their respective ‘starting points’ are considered. Realists start from an 
ontological assertion that the material world exists. On the basis of that ontology they 
build an epistemology in which two key assertions are as follows: first, knowledge 
can be objective (the things we know exist whether we know them or not); and 
second, knowledge claims are fallible (it will always be possible that further 
information will arise which improves our knowledge) (Collier 1994). In contrast, the 
relativist position starts from theorising about what we can know – that is, 
epistemology. Within this approach knowledge is viewed as a social construction, 
with individuals constructing their own knowledge, thus the question of what there 
really is ‘out there’ becomes redundant.   
 
An example of the application of realist and anti-realist (or relativist) principles to 
research in this area is provided by the debate over the ‘truth’ of ADHD as explored 
by Tait (2006).  In summary he argues that the only way in which the reality of 
ADHD as ‘fact’ can be defended is if an anti-realist, specifically a pragmatic, view is 
adopted, because the theory of ADHD as a disorder ‘works’.  However, by taking an 
anti-realist position the ‘hard’ scientific evidence for the existence of ADHD cannot 
be admitted.  It doesn’t help that if this pragmatic view is taken, the contrary view that 
ADHD is a social construction can also be shown to ‘work’.  Tait uses this analysis to 
argue that realists and anti-realists cannot work together, however there is perhaps 
less cause for despair than Tait seems to think.   Tait has chosen to focus on a 
pragmatic version of anti-realism, one in which ‘usefulness’ is taken as a substitute 
for truthfulness (Niiniluoto 1999). However the approach of critical realism, sitting 
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somewhere between the extremes of realism and anti-realism, may offer a more 
positive outcome.  
 
According to the critical realist position it is not inconsistent to believe in the 
existence of an independent external reality and at the same time hold that our 
knowledge of that reality is always fallible and open to critique and revision (Scott 
2005).  This is not to suggest that everyone adopt a critical realist perspective, simply 
to observe that there are routes out of the apparent dualism. 
 
It seems that the long-running dispute within educational research has led to a residual 
crisis of confidence which is exacerbated by the discourse of a ‘gold standard’ of 
research. In this context misconceptions about the authority of ‘science’ abound and, 
as demonstrated by Rowbottom and Asiton (2007), this is at least in part sustained by 
handbooks of educational research. Bridges (2009) has commented on these trends, 
noting that criteria which are applied to assess ‘scientifically-based research’ are also 
being applied to educational research from within the humanities resulting in their 
systematic exclusion from the accepted evidence base for policy-making. In applying 
criteria more appropriate to quantitative studies, most qualitative research would fall 
at the first hurdle: narrative research is not going to pass the test of any power 
calculation and demanding a ‘control group’ would be meaningless.  However, the 
data generated by qualitative methods such as narrative research are no less valuable 
and should generate no less confidence than those produced through randomised 
control trials (Griffiths and Macleod 2008). 
 
Given this context it has been suggested that educational researchers need to have 
more confidence in their methods and to reaffirm claims for their discipline to be 
accepted on its own terms and not be judged against inappropriate criteria (Bridges 
2009). This will be particularly the case when educational researchers are working 
alongside those from more ‘scientific’ traditions such as in interdisciplinary projects. 
Ungar (2003) outlines the unique contributions, which he believes qualitative research 
offers to our understanding of resilience in young people – many of which apply 
equally well to our understanding of disruptive behaviour. In particular, qualitative 
research has a role to play in the early stages of research projects when contextual 
information is what is required. Identifying the information to be considered in an 
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explanatory model examining predispositions to disruptive behaviour can only be 
done by listening to the young people in question and becoming familiar with their 
histories and contexts. It is through this qualitative approach that important contextual 
factors, and importantly, the young people’s understanding of them, will emerge. For 
educational research to contribute to the developing understanding of disruptive 
behaviour it must do so from a position of strength and a sense of what it is capable of 
offering. Trying to make such research fit the criteria from a different research 
paradigm will result in the unique contribution of the kind described by Ungar being 
lost. 
 
A lack of confidence is not the only potential barrier to multidisciplinary working;’ 
the view of medical sciences from within education may also prove problematic. 
There are two areas of difficulty; the first is misunderstanding and/or 
misrepresentation and second is concern with the consequences of engaging with 
medical research.  
 
Here it is useful to return to the characterisation of medical research offered by Purdie 
et al. (2002) above, that the medical approach is one which assumes a norm of 
behaviour, deviation from which is viewed as a result of pathology or disease 
requiring treatment. However, an excerpt from an article published in Psychological 
Bulletin is typical of the kinds of statements encountered in articles in the medical 
sciences. ‘In considering neurobiological influences on behaviour, the recognition that 
any behaviour is the outcome of a complex interplay of individual, developmental, 
and social factors is important’ (Van Goozen et al. 2007: 149).  Indeed the literature 
from neurobiology, psychophysiology, psychiatry and related fields is peppered with 
words and phrases such as ‘possibility’, ‘hard to interpret’, ’somewhat’, ‘could be’, 
‘tentative’; hardly the certainty we have been led to expect from ‘scientific method’. 
This caution in the interpretation of data is not reflected in the representation of 
clinical research as found in educational literature. It does not fit with notions about 
the superiority of ‘positivist’ ‘scientific’ research which is presumed to be full of 
certainties.  
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It seems then that much of the anti-medical orientation may be based on a caricature 
of what passes as ‘hard science’. Another source of resistance concerns anxiety about 
where engaging with the ‘science’ might lead. If fMRI evidence consistently 
identifies group differences in neural activity or structure in young people with 
disruptive behaviour, what has been found? There appears to be a suspicion that 
medics will then assert that therefore disruptive behaviour is caused by a neurological 
disorder, and significantly that this will lead to a proposed chemical solution (Davis 
2006). However this does not fit with what is found in the medical and psychological 
literature. Rather than assuming that differences in brain structure or function must be 
the cause of a disorder, researchers appear open to possibilities – e.g. that different 
developmental pathways result in differences in mature brains (Oliver et al. 2000). In 
fact it seems probable that researchers working in the ‘hard’ sciences are less likely 
than those less familiar with quantitative methods to make the basic error of moving 
from correlation to causation.  However, whilst there may not be grounds for concern 
that claims will be made that the ‘cause’ of disruptive behaviour has been identified, 
there may be other consequences of ‘buying in’ to ideas of neurobiological 
differences. As discussed above, one concern with the medical model is that it 
suggests medical solutions, and can divert attention away from other interventions.  
 
Conclusion 
 
A number of models for multidisciplinary work are emerging such as in social 
neuroscience, a new discipline that has been described as ‘a new multi-level 
integrative analysis approach, rather than solely biological or social' 
(http://www.social-neuroscience.com/). However the method for combining the 
biological and social in an ‘integrative analysis’ remains unclear. Data from research 
based on different epistemological and ontological assumptions cannot simply be 
bundled together for ‘integrative analysis’; they tell different stories, respond to 
different questions, have different understandings of truthfulness and authenticity. 
Whilst the terms epistemology and ontology will be familiar to most, what is required 
is some deeper understanding about the status of different claims to knowledge. It is 
for this reason that any emerging multidisciplinary networks might benefit from 
having at least one philosopher (or someone philosophically informed) among its 
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members to help guide discussion on some of the issues which have been discussed in 
this paper.  
 
Here what is being argued for is the presence of someone with a specific expertise in 
epistemology to be involved in interdisciplinary teams. Of course whether that person 
would attend wearing the label ‘philosopher’ is not important. Indeed as Bridges 
(2003) has suggested, disciplinary labels and the allocation of disciplinary tasks are 
perhaps not the best model for a successful research group. What does seem to be 
important is the presence in any research team of people who are inclined (whether 
for reasons of personal academic biography, or personality, or some other) to ask 
philosophical questions ‘because serious and informed engagement with the 
philosophical issues in educational research is part and parcel of the professional 
practice of the entire research group’ (2002: 9). If this is indeed a requirement for an 
educational research team, then how much more might it be a requirement for an 
interdisciplinary one? 
 
In this paper the different styles of writing which are appropriate to the different 
disciplines have been presented.  Anyone who has published in the academic press 
will be familiar with a range of ‘house styles’ which authors must conform to if they 
hope to have their work published.  Bridges (2009) reports the experiences of an 
educational researcher working on a project along with researchers from the medical 
sciences. When seeking publication of their findings the researcher found their work 
being ‘impoverished by the requirements to publish in a mode which imitated medical 
science’ (Bridges 2009:8).  
 
A promising new addition (2007) to the list of Educational journals is Mind, Brain 
and Education which encourages submissions from ‘all fields that are relevant to 
connecting mind, brain, and education in research, theory, and/or practice’ (Wiley, 
2010). However the detailed instructions to authors require that ‘Investigations on 
experimental animals must indicate that their care was in accord with institutional 
guidelines.’ Further, ‘The style of the Publication Manual of the American 
Psychological Association, 5th edition, must be followed…’ (Wiley 2010). These 
requirements clearly reveal the journal’s discipline of origin. Perhaps a journal with 
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an editorial board which issued instruction for submissions to conform to a recognised 
style from the home discipline of the author(s) would help create a journal in which 
contributors from all fields felt equally that the journal was ‘for them’. Of course this 
would not be without difficulties for those responsible for the practicalities of 
publishing the accepted articles. 
 
It has been argued that if educational sociologists, psychologists, neuropsychologists, 
psychiatrists and others are to work together, as with any professional grouping, this 
must be on the basis of mutual trust and respect. Some of the barriers to effective 
multidisciplinary working discussed above might be overcome through making 
explicit the assumptions at work in each discipline in order that a shared 
understanding (which is not necessarily the same as agreement) can be reached. 
Before we embark on ambitious multidisciplinary grant applications there is a prior 
level of preparatory groundwork which needs to be done. This might, for example, 
involve seminars in which researchers from all disciplines with an interest in this area 
could share their perspectives and the assumptions on which they are based. Just as in 
multidisciplinary practice, it may be that a small group of researchers with a strong 
commitment to making things work is the best way forward. What may be required is 
a greater degree of familiarisation at an individual level between people who are 
committed to exploring the possibilities of working across disciplines. 
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